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Policy has increasingly shifted towards economic incentives and liability attenuation for 
promoting cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated sites, but little is known about 
the effectiveness of such policies. An example of such legislation is State Voluntary 
Cleanup Programs (VCPs), which were established in the US in the 1990s and to date 
have been implemented in almost every state. We examine Baltimore properties that 
participated in the Maryland VCP from its inception in 1997 to the end of 2006. 
Specifically, we examine what type of properties tend to participate in these programs, 
how these properties compare to other eligible but non-participating sites, and what is 
the redevelopment potential of VCP properties and implications towards open space 
conversion. We find that most applicants (66%) actually requested a “No Further Action 
Determination” directly, rather than proposing cleanup. VCP properties tend to be 
industrial, located in industrial areas, and away from residential neighborhoods. In more 
recent years larger industrial properties have increasingly enrolled in the program. The 
majority of sites are reused as industrial or commercial. In contrast to Alberini (2007), 
this suggests that pressure for residential development does not drive VCP participation. 
Based on differences in zoning requirements, the VCP may reduce demand for 
potentially contaminating activities on pristine land by as much as 1,238 to 6,444 acres, 
in Baltimore alone. 
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VOLUNTARY CLEANUPS AND REDEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL:  
LESSONS FROM BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 
 
  
By Dennis Guignet and Anna Alberini 
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
Many observers believe that the liability regime imposed by federal and state 
hazardous waste programs in the US is at least partially responsible for discouraging the 
purchase and reuse of contaminated or potentially contaminated sites, which have remained 
idle or underutilized.
1 The resulting “brownfields”—industrial sites whose expansion, 
redevelopment, or reuse “may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a 
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant” (US EPA, 2007), to the point that public 
intervention may be needed (Alker et al., 2000)—cover thousands of acres in many urban and 
rural areas of the country (US General Accounting Office, 1995).  
A number of state programs and federal legislation have recently been established in 
an attempt to reverse these disincentives and stimulate cleanup and productive reuse of 
brownfields. For example, in the 1990s, several States established Voluntary Cleanup 
Programs (VCPs) offering liability relief, other economic inducements such as tax credits or 
low-cost loans, oversight and expedited approval of cleanup plans, and simplified cleanup 
standards in exchange for site remediation (Bartsch and Dorfman, 2000; Meyer and 
VanLandingham, 2000).  
                                                 
1 The Superfund program was established by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), passed in 1980 and amended and re-authorized in 1986. It is probably the best known 
among the public programs addressing hazardous waste sites in the US.  Under the Superfund program the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to identify contaminated sites needing remediation, 
track down the responsible parties and force them to pay for cleanup (or reimburse the Agency for the cleanups it 
initiated). Liability for the cost of cleanup is retroactive, strict, and joint-and-several, with potentially responsible 
parties to be sought among the owners and operators of the site, and transporters of the wastes. Liability has in 
some cases been construed to apply to property owners and lenders that foreclose on contaminated properties 
(Fogleman, 1992).  
   3
Under the Federal Brownfield Tax Incentive, since 1997 environmental cleanup costs 
for properties that meet specified requirements have been fully deductible in the year in which 
they are incurred, as long as the property is for use in a trade or business or for the production 
of income. Likewise, state brownfields programs grant tax credits or other benefits for 
cleanup and investment at potentially contaminated properties in blighted areas.  
Finally, the federal Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfield Revitalization Act 
of 2002 provides conditional relief from environmental liability for property owners and 
purchasers of land. This law also establishes the EPA Brownfield Program, which provides 
assessment and cleanup grants to state and local governments and communities, as well as 
grants which states can use to establish revolving loan funds.  
Little is known about the effectiveness of these economic incentives and liability 
attenuation policies in promoting cleanup and redevelopment. Questions have been raised 
about whether these programs effectively provide public funding to redevelopment projects 
that would have occurred anyway (Alberini, 2007), and concerns exist about dedicated public 
funding that is left unspent (Schoenbaum, 2002).  Common assertions that the majority of 
brownfield properties are former industrial lands, that they are usually found in central cities, 
and that their redevelopment is riskier and less profitable than equivalent projects on pristine 
lands and suburban areas have been recently challenged (Page and Berger, 2006; DeSousa, 
2000). Deason et al. (2001) analyze urban redevelopment projects and compute the size of 
equivalent projects in open and suburban areas, showing that the latter often take up 
considerable more land than infill redevelopment, thus contributing to sprawl and erosion of 
open space.     4
For these reasons, it is important to understand what types of properties tend to 
participate in programs that offer incentives and assistance for brownfield cleanup and 
redevelopment. In this paper, we examine the Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP) of the state 
of Maryland. We ask three related questions: First, what types of properties tend to participate 
in the Maryland VCP? Second, how do these properties compare with other eligible but 
nonparticipating industrial and commercial properties?  Third, what is the redevelopment 
potential of VCP parcels, and can redevelopment of VCP sites help prevent conversion of 
agricultural land and open space in suburban and rural areas of the State?  
To answer these questions, we examine the parcels enrolled in the VCP from its onset 
(in 1997) to late December 2006. To ensure a relatively homogeneous (legal and tax) 
environment, attention is restricted to participating properties in Baltimore City.
2 We 
supplement this set of parcels with a sample of comparable size drawn at random from the 
universe of industrial and commercial properties in Baltimore City, which we use as a 
“control” group. The newly formed sample—enlisted properties plus “controls”—allows us to 
establish whether the VCP tends to attract parcels that are systematically different from the 
rest of the supply of industrial and commercial properties in Baltimore.   
Simple univariate analyses suggest that VCP enlistees are generally larger and less 
capital intensive than the bulk of industrial and commercial properties in Baltimore, and have 
a higher prior probability of contamination than non-participating parcels. Probit regressions 
confirm that participation is more likely among industrial sites located in industrial areas, and 
less likely where buildings are present and close to residential areas. 
Even more important, the probit regressions point to the changing nature of the 
program—or of the sites that tend to be attracted to the program. In the first few years, smaller 
                                                 
2 By “Baltimore City” we mean Baltimore City County, i.e., the independent-city county with FIPS code 24510.   5
properties tended to be attracted into the program. Most recently, however, participation has 
been more likely among larger properties, and the prevalence of industrial sites among the 
participants has become even stronger.  
To answer the third question, we examine the restrictions imposed on the property 
when the State agency granted “No further action” status or issued a certificate of cleanup 
completion. In most cases, residential uses are not allowed, some physical maintenance is 
required to avoid exposure to contaminants, and use of groundwater on the premises for 
drinking purposes is prohibited.  There is very little evidence of changes in the land use at 
participating sites, and at any rate participating properties tend to be located primarily away 
from residential areas. Taken together, these facts suggest that VCP sites will likely remain in 
some type of industrial or commercial use. These conclusions are in sharp contrast with 
Alberini (2007), who finds that the Colorado VCP tends to attract sites under residential 
development pressure.   
Finally, we use the figures presented in Deason et al. (2001) to compute the area that 
would be reasonably required if instead of redeveloping the Baltimore VCP properties, 
equivalent projects were undertaken in more rural/suburban areas of the State. Under alternate 
assumptions, we estimate this total area to be between 1,238 and 6,444 acres. We conclude 
that the VCP holds good promise as a tool for reducing pressure on the conversion of open 
space and agricultural land. This finding should be interpreted with caution. Comparison of 
the findings of this paper with previous research (Alberini, 2007) suggests that until further 
research is done on this topic it will be difficult to extrapolate from one specific program and 
its achievements to another.    6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background 
information and describes the Maryland VCP. Section 3 reviews the literature. Section 4 
presents our econometric model of participation in a VCP and data sources. Section 5 
describes the data and section 6 the estimation results. Section 7 discusses the implications of 
our findings, and Section 8 concludes.   
 
2. Background  
A. Brownfields and Brownfields Programs 
In the United States, there is a large supply of properties where prior industrial uses 
have resulted in contamination of soil, surface water and/or groundwater with pollutants that 
are noxious to human health and ecological systems. The US GAO (1995) estimates a 
nationwide total of 130,000 to 450,000 contaminated commercial and industrial sites.  
It is widely felt that site contamination, or even suspicion of contamination, seriously 
hampers reuse. Many observers argue that the mere placement of a property on federal or 
state registries of sites needing investigation about possible contamination turns them into 
brownfields. Removal from such registries (the so-called “de-listing”) would automatically 
remove any contamination “stigma” (Bartsch et al., 1996). 
  Starting in the 1990s, the States, realizing that their enforcement-based programs did 
not have sufficient funding to address the large number of contaminated sites needing 
attention, began developing an alternative approach based on voluntary cleanup programs (US 
GAO, 1997). It has recently been suggested that less financial support from the EPA and slow 
progression at Superfund sites, among other factors, increase the likelihood of state adoption 
of a VCP (Daley, 2007). By 2000, over 90% of the states had a VCP in place (Meyer, 2000).      7
Program offerings and requirements vary widely across states (Meyer, 2000; US EPA, 
2005). Many state-level voluntary cleanup programs grant liability relief in exchange for 
voluntary cleanup, provided that the latter is approved by the state agency, in the form of a 
letter of no further action, a certificate of completion, or a covenant not to sue.
3  
  Voluntary cleanup programs often spell out simplified or variable cleanup standards 
linked to land use, and hence to residents and workers’ likely exposure to contaminants. Some 
states allow for engineering controls, such as caps, fences, or other physical means of 
preventing contact with pollution, and/or offer institutional controls, such as permanent land 
use restrictions or monitoring of the contamination plume, in lieu of a more permanent 
cleanup. The US GAO (1997) surveyed 17 states with VCPs and found that in many of them 
over 50% of the cleanups entailed non-permanent remedies and/or selected industrial land use 
standards. 
In addition, the State frequently offers fast-track oversight of cleanup plans. This helps 
reduce the time it takes before remediation is undertaken, as well as the uncertainty associated 
with stringency of cleanup standards (Meyer, 2000). At many locales, completion of 
voluntary cleanups at eligible sites can be combined with local, state, and federal 
“brownfields” programs that offer subsidies in the form of tax credits or low-cost loans.  State 
VCP managers believe that the programs have resulted in the reporting of contaminated sites 
that were previously unknown to the state agency, and have truly encouraged cleanups, as 
long as the program requirements are not too burdensome to the applicants.
4  
                                                 
3 A covenant not to sue is generally regarded as the strongest form of assurance, since for all practical purposes it 
is a contract by which the State commits not to sue over contamination at the site, as long as certain conditions 
are met. 
4 For example, the 1997 US GAO study notes that public involvement requirements are generally judged 
inappropriate, and hence a hurdle to remediation, for the type of sites usually targeted by VCPs—industrial sites 
with light contamination.    8
 
B. The Maryland VCP  
The Maryland VCP was established in 1997.  Any property that is or perceived to be 
contaminated by controlled hazardous substances or oil (since October 2004) is eligible for 
participation, including sites on federal or state registries.  Sites on the National Priorities List, 
sites under active enforcement by the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE), 
currently operating RCRA sites, and sites contaminated after October 1, 1997 (if the applicant 
is a responsible party) are not eligible. Certain exceptions may apply to sites under MDE 
enforcement.  
  Eligible applicants include property owners, commercial lenders, developers, 
prospective purchasers, lessees, innocent purchasers and operators.  The application must 
contain a Phase I and Phase II environmental site assessment, a $6,000 application fee and 
any other information about the property required by the agency. The applicant may request a 
“No Further Requirements Determination,” which, if granted, implies no need to perform 
remedial work, or, upon approval of the response plan and of remediation, a “Certification of 
Completion.” Both include certain liability assurances and are recorded in the Land Records.   
The liability relief offered is not absolute: so-called reopeners are possible if new 
contamination occurs at the property, if cleanup exacerbates—rather than ameliorates—the 
existing contamination, if undiscovered contamination is found, or if there is an imminent and 
substantial threat to human health.  However, at the time of this writing, MDE notes that only 
two reopeners have been issued since the inception of the program.
5 A Certificate of 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
5 http://www.mde.state.md.us/Programs/LandPrograms/ERRP_Brownfields/vcp_info/vcp_eligibility.asp, 
accessed 8 May 2008.    9
Completion (CoC) does not provide protection against third party suits, but does provide 
contribution protection against a third party suit.
6  
 
3. Previous Literature 
We are aware of only a handful of previous studies that have examined the economic 
incentives at play in VCPs. Alberini (2007) focuses on the Colorado VCP, and concludes that 
this program has not addressed sites on federal registries, has implied actual cleanups at only 
one-third of the participating sites, and seems to attract properties that are very likely to be 
redeveloped soon. She also finds that property values tend to be lower in truly contaminated 
properties, but rebound almost completely after participation. Using data from the State of 
Ohio for 1989-1992, Sementelli and Simons (1997) find that receiving a letter of “no further 
action” from the State does not improve transaction rates for sites with leaking underground 
storage tanks, which continue to be bought and sold much less frequently than non-tank 
commercial properties. 
Page and Berger (2006) examine properties that entered into the VCPs of Texas and 
New York, emphasizing that these are only a subset of the entire universe of brownfields in 
those states. They wish to empirically test four common beliefs about brownfields, namely 
that they are (i) the results of past industrial land use, (ii) in abundant supply in older 
industrial regions, (iii) primarily an urban problem, and (iv) created by pollution events that 
took place before the Superfund statute (or similar state legislation). Texas and New York 
lend themselves to these research questions because of their different histories in terms of 
industrial development and recent population and employment trends. 
                                                 
6 In other words, another responsible party who has been sued by parties other than the State or Federal Agency 
cannot demand reimbursement from the recipient of a Certificate of Completion.    10
Page and Berger distinguish between previous industrial or commercial use, and use at 
the time of entry into the program, finding that Texas actually has higher percentages of sites 
with prior and current industrial uses than New York, and that a higher share of the New York 
brownfields are abandoned at the time they entered the program (21% v. 8%, respectively). 
The majority of the Texas sites are in urban areas and in central cities (87% and 64% of the 
total, respectively, against 49% and 30% for New York). They conclude that industrial uses 
do account for the majority—but not an overwhelming majority (53%)—of the properties 
enrolled in the New York and Texas VCPs, and that suburban properties are surprisingly more 
common in the New York program.    
Page and Berger also raise the issue of distribution of size of brownfield properties.  
They report that half of the properties enrolled in the New York VCP were one acre or less, 
while over three-quarters of the properties in the Texas VCP were at least one acre or larger.  
Since VCPs often have explicit land revitalization goals, our research is also related to 
the literature that has examined developer interest in reusing brownfield properties.  Stated-
preference surveys in Europe (Alberini et al., 2005) and in the US (Wernstedt et al., 2006) 
suggest that developers can be attracted to contaminated sites by offering them subsidies, 
liability relief, and less stringent regulation.
7  The appeal of these incentives varies with the 
developer’s prior experience with contaminated properties.  
                                                 
7 Economic inducements have been advocated as potentially effective for stimulating cleanup and redevelopment 
of brownfields (Bartsch et al., 1996; DeSousa, 2004; Howland, 2000, 2004; Yount and Meyer, 1999).  The 
effectiveness of economic development incentives remains a controversial matter even with non-contaminated 
properties. For example, recent studies suggest a statistically significant, positive relationship between tax 
incentives and regional and local growth and property values (Bartik, 1991; Greenstone and Moretti, 2003; 
Newman and Sullivan, 1988; Wasylenko, 1997), but researchers dispute the magnitude of the impacts of 
incentives on overall economic gains in targeted areas (Fisher and Peters, 1998; Fox and Murray, 2004; Peters 
and Fisher, 2002).  Research in this area is afflicted by the problem that concurrent incentives make it very 
difficult to disentangle the effects of each, a problem that can be remedied only by deploying very careful quasi-
experimental approaches with control and treatment groups (Bartik, 2004; Greenstone and Moretti, 2003).  It   11
De Sousa (2000) interviews a small number (N=18) of developers, landowners, and 
city officials, about their perceptions of redevelopment opportunities and economic incentives 
for brownfields, finding that liability is judged the most important obstacle to brownfield 
projects. Landowners and developers share similar views, especially on liability attenuation, 
suggesting that VCPs that offer protection from liability are likely to attract primarily these 
parties.   
Meyer and Lyons (2000) suggest that low property prices have played a larger role 
than subsidies in stimulating entrepreneurial redevelopment activity on contaminated sites, 
and that obtaining subsidies may entail significant transaction costs that offset their value. 
McGrath (2000) finds that contamination risk—i.e., the probability that a previously used site 
is contaminated, based on the previous use—does affect urban industrial redevelopment in 
Chicago both directly, and indirectly, via the differential in price before and after 
redevelopment.  
Deason et al. (2001), De Sousa (2000) and Sigman (2005) have studied the potential 
for substitution between infill redevelopment and development of pristine or agricultural 
lands—the so-called greenfields. Based on zoning and land use ordinances for several cities, 
Deason et al. estimate that an industrial, commercial, and residential development project 
requires an average of 6, over two, and over 5 times more land, respectively, in greenfield 
areas than they do at urban brownfield properties. These differences are driven by local 
requirements in terms of setbacks, height of buildings, parking facilities, and percentage of 
the property that can be covered by buildings. De Sousa (2000) reports that, contrary to claims 
sometimes made by developers, in downtown Toronto residential projects are actually more 
                                                                                                                                                         
remains difficult, however, to ascertain whether incentives were effective or business locations and/or area 
redevelopment would have taken place even in their absence (Peters and Fisher, 2004).   12
profitable at brownfields than in suburban areas (due to demand and prices of downtown 
residential properties).  
We conclude our literature review by noting that not everyone agrees that actual or 
suspected contamination is a deterrent to redevelopment. Based on interviews with real estate 
agents, Howland (2004) suggests that incompatible land uses, inadequate infrastructure and 
obsolete buildings are more important barriers than contamination to the revitalization of 
brownfields in Baltimore. Schoenbaum (2002) finds no significant difference in assessed land 
values, vacancy rates, property turnover, and redevelopment rates across brownfield and non-
brownfield properties in an industrial area of Baltimore over 1963-1999.
  
 
4. Model, Sample and Data Sources 
A. The Model.  
Consider a set of “candidate” parcels. We assume that a parcel is enrolled in the VCP 
if the net benefits of participation are positive,
8 and that these benefits depend on 
characteristics of the property and surrounding neighborhood. Let VCP* denote the net 
benefits of parcel i’s participation in the program in year t, and assume that: 
(1)     ,    it it it VCP η β + = x
*
where x is a vector of parcel and neighborhood characteristics, β is a vector of unknown 
coefficients, and η is an i.i.d. standard normal error term. 
                                                 
8 For an owner, the net benefits would be the appreciation in the value of the property, minus the cost of 
remediation, the participation fee, and any other associated costs. For a developer, the net benefits are the profits 
from the project, net of land acquisition costs, transformation costs, remediation costs, VCP fee, etc. The avoided 
liability and litigation costs would presumably be captured into the appreciation and proceeds from the project, 
respectively.    13
  We cannot observe the net benefits of participation, but because we assume that 
properties are signed up (i.e., VCP=1) when the net benefits of participation are positive, we 
obtain a probit equation: 
(2)     ,   ) ( ) 0 Pr( ) 1 (
* β it it it VCP VCP E x Φ = ≥ = =
where Φ(•) is the standard normal cdf.  Because a site can only participate in the program 
once, we specify the log likelihood function as: 
(3)   ,   () () () [] ∑∑
=ℑ ∈
Φ − ⋅ − + Φ ⋅ =
2006
1997
1 log ) 1 ( log log
ti
it it it it
t
VCP VCP L β β x x
where i denotes the site, t denotes the year of the program, and  t ℑ  is the set “at risk” at time t 
(i.e., the set of candidate sites that have not participated yet in year t).
9 Equation (3) is, 
effectively, a discrete-time duration model, and can be easily amended to incorporate site-
specific random effects, which capture unobserved parcel characteristics that may influence 
participation (see Greene, 2008, p. 796-806).
10  
 
B. The Sample  
Our goal is to estimate a probit equation that predicts the probability of participation in 
the VCP as a function of site and neighborhood characteristics. Estimating this probit 
equation requires a sample of both participating sites and eligible but non-participating sites.  
We obtained data about the VCP applications and sites from the Maryland Department 
of the Environment (MDE). As of December 20, 2006, more than 400 applications had been 
submitted to the Maryland VCP.  
                                                 
9 For example, if a site participates in the program in 1999, it is dropped from the sample for all subsequent 
years. 
10 The random effects probit assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors x. It 
is not possible to estimate a fixed effects model, because estimation would have to rely on parcels dropping in 
and out of the participation status, a situation that is not possible here.     14
In this paper, attention is restricted to VCP sites in Baltimore City since the onset of 
the program up to 20 December 2006.  By participation, we mean a direct application for 
either a No Further Requirements Determination (NFRD) or an actual cleanup proposal, so 
we lump together applications for a NFRD and a Certificate of Completion (CoC). In some 
cases there are multiple applicants for the same site; in a few cases a single site is comprised 
of multiple parcels. When multiple parties apply for the same property, we define 
participation to occur at the time of the earliest submittal for that property.  
Using these criteria, we obtain a total of 116 participating sites in Baltimore City as of 
December 20, 2006.  Of these 116 sites, 37 (32%) were signed up with the goal of obtaining a 
CoC, which requires submitting and executing a remedial plan, 77 (66%) applied directly for 
a NFRD, and no information is available for the two remaining sites. 
We now have the full list of participating properties, but how exactly does one go 
about defining the eligible but non-participating properties? Since “Any property 
contaminated or perceived to be contaminated by controlled hazardous substances or oil is 
eligible for participation,” and Noonan and Vidich (1992) show that properties used for most 
industrial and commercial purposes have a moderate to high probability of contamination, it is 
reasonable to assume that any parcel slated for industrial or commercial use in Baltimore is a 
credible candidate for inclusion in the sample (see Sigman, 2005, and Page and Berger, 2006). 
The first step in constructing our sample is thus to draw a random sample of N=131 
industrial and commercial parcels out of the universe of all such sites in Baltimore. To make 
these randomly selected parcels proper “controls” for the participating properties, we form 
predictions for the likelihood of contamination (PROBCON) based on current land use at the 
site and on the estimated probabilities reported by Noonan and Vidich (1992). This variable is   15
included in our probit regressions, along with a companion missing-value dummy when the 
records from the Maryland Department of Taxation do not contain specific land use 
information. 
In sum, by drawing a random sample of nonparticipating properties of roughly the 
same size as that of the participating properties, and controlling for an obvious determinant of 
their interest in the VCP, we are effectively constructing a “control” group (see Shadish, Cook 
and Campbell, 2002) that can be compared with VCP participants.   
For each of the 10 years of our study period (1997-2006), the sample we use for the 
probit model is comprised of the participating parcels that have not signed up yet, plus all of 
the 131 abovementioned non-participating sites.  This results in a total of 247 properties and 
2097 observations.  
 
C. Other Independent Variables 
We proxy the net profits of participation with parcel and neighborhood characteristics. 
These include the size of the parcel (SIZE), a dummy for the presence of a building or 
improvement (BUILDING), an interaction between the presence of a building and the year of 
construction of the oldest building on the premises (BUILDINGYRBUILT), and the capital 
intensity (CAPITAL) of the parcel, which we define as the total square footage of the building 
divided by the area of the property.  
These variables proxy for remediation and demolition costs. Heavily built sites may 
differ from others in terms of demolition and cleanup costs because of toxic construction 
materials (e.g., asbestos, heavy metals).  To avoid losing observations to the analysis because 
of missing values, we created companion dummy variables to denote missing values, recoded   16
the original missing values to zero, and included both the regressors of interest and the 
companion missing value dummies in the right-hand side of our probit regressions.  
A parcel’s value should also be influenced by its distance to the central business 
district (CBDDIST) and to major roads (MJRRDDIST),
11 whether it is for industrial use 
(MINDUSTRIAL), surrounding land use, and distance to the nearest residential zone 
(RESZNEDIST). We include the latter variable because Howland (2003, 2004) discusses how 
potential buyers in Baltimore are reluctant to purchase industrial property near residential 
areas because of incompatible activities and greater political barriers.   Regarding land use, 
we use 1996 land use data from the Maryland Department of Planning to form 500- and 1500-
meter buffers around each property and compute the percentage of the area of the buffer in 
various types of land use, such as low-, medium- and high-density residential, industrial, and 
commercial.  
A parcel’s eligibility for Enterprise Zone incentives (usually in the form of tax credits 
if a business is established on the premises) and for federal Empowerment Zone incentives 
(dummies ENTZNE and EMPZNE) may also influence its participation in the VCP. It should 
be noted that these incentives are associated with setting up a business or offering employees 
certain educational opportunities at specific locations, and are unrelated to contamination and 
cleanup. They may, nevertheless, increase the attractiveness of a location to a developer and 
to prospective buyers. 
It is of interest to check whether VCP sites tend to be clustered, reflecting either some 
effect on surrounding properties (i.e., participating sites induce further participation) or 
simply the spatial concentration of the existing supply of contaminated sites.  We control for 
this tendency with the number of sites previously enrolled in the VCP within a 1500 meter 
                                                 
11 Data from the Maryland State Highway Administration.   17
buffer of each property (LNEARVCPS).  Our last set of independent variables is comprised of 
median house values (MDVALHS) and socioeconomic characteristics of the residents in the 
neighborhood measured at the 2000 Census tract level.   
 
5. The Data  
A. Description of Properties 
For 92 of the 116 sites participating in the VCP, we were able to identify the 
corresponding parcel(s) in the Maryland Department of Taxation database, and to append 
information about the parcel, its exact location (latitude and longitude), structures, assessed 
value, and recent sales (if any).  The 116 participating sites are actually comprised of 172 
properties, since in 21 cases one VCP application consists of multiple adjacent parcels.
12 The 
same type of parcel information is also available for the 131 “control” properties.  
  Descriptive statistics of the sample are displayed in table 1. The average parcel in our 
sample covers about 5 acres, and is located a little over 2 miles from the CBD. Almost all 
parcels (79%) have a building or other improvement, which account on average for 77% of 
the total property area (variable CAPITAL). Due to the criteria we used for constructing our 
sample, industrial properties account for over 40% of all parcels. 
  Table 1 also shows that we were able to impute the prior probability of contamination 
for 175 properties.
  Regarding additional neighborhood characteristics, half of the parcels in 
our sample are located in a state Enterprise Zone and 23% are in a federal Empowerment 
Zone. On average industrial uses account for about 25% of the 500-meter buffer and almost 
                                                 
12 Specifically, out of the 116 VCP sites, 95 consist of a single parcel, 12 of two parcels, 3 of three parcels, and 1 
each of four, five, six, seven, eight and fourteen properties.   18
20% of the 1500-meter buffer around the properties. The median housing value in the 
surrounding census tract is on average about $73,000. 
 
B. Comparison across VCP and Non-participating Sites 
Maps of the VCP sites suggest that participating properties are more likely to be in 
areas where economic inducements, such as those associated with Enterprise Zones and 
federal Empowerment Zones, are offered to firms (see map A.1 in Appendix A). Although 
they tend to be roughly at the same distance from the city center, participating sites tend to be 
farther from major roads than non-participating eligible properties (see map A.2 in Appendix 
A). Participating sites are more likely to be surrounded by industrial properties, and tend to be 
located farther away from residential zones (see map A.3 in Appendix A). This confirms that 
our probit model should control for the industrial v. another use of the parcel, for the 
prevalent uses in the neighborhood, and for distance to the nearest residential area, as 
mentioned in section 4.  
We compare the means of all variables across participating and non-participating sites 
in our sample in table 2. This table shows that participating properties tend to be considerably 
larger than non-participating eligible properties, and somewhat less likely to contain buildings 
or other improvements.
13  
Participating properties tend to be less capital-intensive. Buildings at participating 
sites are likely slated for demolition during redevelopment, thus a less capital intensive site 
                                                 
13 We note that sometimes multiple parcels were combined into the same application to the VCP (and into the 
same redevelopment project). The average size of a VCP site is 9.82 acres for the sites consisting of one parcel, 
13.52 for the sites comprised of two parcels, 4.49 for the sites comprised of 3 parcels, 1.5 for one site comprised 
of 4 parcels, 1.21 for the one site comprised of 5 parcels, 54.34 for the one site with 6 parcels, 1.98 for the one 
site with 7 parcels, 6 acres for the one site with 8 parcels, and finally 1.44 for the one site with 14 parcels. This 
suggests that in some cases it was necessary for developers to combine several very small parcels together to get 
a site of acceptable size for redevelopment.    19
may be more attractive due to lower demolition costs.  Howland (2004) interviewed 
Baltimore real estate agents and industrial property owners and found that the expense of 
removing obsolete structures is one barrier to redevelopment. 
  There are no systematic differences across the two groups of properties in terms of 
housing values and share of residents with a college degree. The proportion of residents who 
own their homes—as opposed to renting them—is higher in the vicinity of participating 
properties than near non-participating properties. The proportion of residents living in poverty 
tends to be lower surrounding participating properties.  In terms of race and ethnicity of the 
neighborhood, participating properties tend to be located in neighborhoods with less African-
Americans, but there is no systematic difference regarding the proportion of persons of 
Hispanic heritage.    20






SIZE  area of parcel in acres  247  5.390 12.020
CBDDIST  distance to CBD (Inner Harbor) in meters  246  3764.99 2321.17
BUILDING  building or other improvement present (dummy)  247  0.794 0.406
YRBUILT  year the oldest building was built  52  1943.31 30.944
CAPITAL capital  intensity    247  0.768 1.228
MJRDDIST  distance to nearest major road in meters  246  466.375 481.852
PROBCON   a priori probability of contamination  175  0.475 0.304
PROBCONMISSING  probability of contamination undefined (dummy)  247  0.291 0.455
ENTZNE  located in enterprise zone (dummy)  246  0.516 0.501
EMPZNE  located in empowerment zone (dummy)  246  0.236 0.425
LNEARVCPS 
number of properties previously enrolled in VCP 
within 1500m buffer (all years)  247  2.530 4.413
MINDUSTRIAL  zoned industrial (dummy)  247  0.417 0.494
PCTIND 
percent of land slated for industrial within 1500m 
buffer 246  0.196 0.212
PCTIND500M 
percent of land slated for industrial within 500m 
buffer 246  0.257 0.310
RESZNEDIST  distance to nearest residential zone in meters  246  155.439 202.877
MDVALHS 
median housing value in census tract (2000 
dollars) 245  73267 36745
PCTPOVERTY 
percent of census tract population living below 
poverty line  246  0.237 0.125
PCTOWNERS  percent residents in census tract who own home  246  0.481 0.228
PCTBLACKS  percent blacks in census tract  246  0.364 0.335
PCTHISPANICS percent  Hispanics  in census tract  246  0.024 0.027
PCTCOLLEGE 
percent persons with college degree in census 
tract 246  0.175 0.150  21
Table 2. Comparison of means of variables for participating (VCP=1) and non-
participating (VCP=0) parcels. T test of the null hypothesis that the difference in the 
means is zero. 
Variable 
VCP=0 VCP=1 









SIZE 131  1.188 5.940 116 10.134  15.046 -6.003**
CBDDIST 131  3834.800 2579.010 115 3685.470  1995.580 0.511
BUILDING 131  0.901 0.300 116 0.672  0.471 4.476**
YRBUILT 5  1917.000 26.833 47 1946.110  30.261 -2.277**
CAPITAL 131  1.141 1.305 116 0.347  0.982 5.435**
MJRDDIST 131  322.770 421.112 115 629.959  496.055 -5.197**
PROBCON   100  0.278 0.183 75 0.736  0.225 -14.419**
PROBCONMISSING 131  0.237 0.427 116 0.353  0.480 -2.010*
ENTZNE 131  0.427 0.497 115 0.617  0.488 -3.020**
EMPZNE 131  0.168 0.375 115 0.313  0.466 -2.667**
LNEARVCPS 131  2.416 4.569 116 2.722  4.132 -0.553
MINDUSTRIAL 131  0.145 0.353 116 0.724 0.449 -11.164**
PCTIND 131  0.080 0.130 115 0.327  0.211 -10.864**
PCTIND500M 131  0.084 0.187 115 0.454  0.305 -11.277**
RESZNEDIST 131  103.986 164.188 115 214.051  226.290 -4.314**
MDVALHS 130  75297.690 45078.930 115 70972.170  24094.090 0.951
PCTPOVERTY 131  0.260 0.137 115 0.211  0.104 3.183**
PCTOWNERS 131  0.409 0.235 115 0.563  0.190 -5.648**
PCTBLACKS 131  0.474 0.339 115 0.239  0.285 5.903**
PCTHISPANICS 131  0.023 0.028 115 0.025 0.027 -0.635
PCTCOLLEGE 131  0.177 0.144 115 0.172  0.158 0.250
^ = significant at the 10% level; * = significant at the 5% level; ** = significant at the 1% level. 
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C. Features of Participating Sites  
Among the VCP properties, we found no obvious differences between those that 
applied for a NFRD and those for which a cleanup plan was submitted, other than in the 
prior probability of contamination, which is larger for the latter group. Among 
participating properties, those slated for industrial use tend to be larger than commercial 
properties.  
Figure 1 displays the distribution of land use at Baltimore City participating sites 
by the year of enrollment, showing that (i) participation has picked up steam since the 
inception of the program, with the largest enrollment (22) in 2006, and (ii) industrial 
properties make up the majority of the enlisted sites. Commercial properties started being 
signed up for the program starting in 2000, but still account for a small fraction of all 
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Perusal of figure 1 suggests that, all else the same, participation rates and hence 
the likelihood of participation have changed over time. This may have occurred because 
of changes in the eligibility criteria, changes in the economic climate of the city, and 
changes in the real estate market. For this reason, we group the ten years from the 
inception of the program to 2006 into three discrete periods (1997-1999, 2000-2003, and 
2004-2006), and interact key regressors with dummies for these periods.   
The late 1990s period captures the early years of the program. In 1999 there was a 
change in Baltimore City’s government when Mayor Martin O’Malley took over for Kurt 
Schmoke, who had been mayor since 1987.  This change in City Government may have 
resulted in changes of several aspects of City law, taxation, redevelopment efforts, etc.  In 
2004, the VCP program was changed, in that it began to admit oil pollution sites.  These 
are likely to differ in size and/or use relative to sites contaminated by other hazardous 
wastes.  For example, gas stations are comparatively small and are considered a 
commercial use. A change in political climate also occurred after 2003, when Robert 
Ehrlich, a Republican, took over as Governor of Maryland for Democrat Parris 
Glendening.  It is possible that this shift in State Government may have changed 
priorities for state agencies. 
  Based on these considerations, we enter in the model the variable SIZE—a likely 
determinant of participation—plus SIZE2, the interaction term between SIZE and the 
dummy denoting the second period of the study (2000-2003), and SIZE3, the interaction 
term between SIZE and the third period of the study (2004-2006).  This inclusion allows 
for the effect of property size on the probability of participation to vary over time. 
   24
6. Estimation Results 
Table 3 reports the results for the random effects probit model of participation.
14  
We present four specifications. Specification (A) is our base specification, which 
includes size of the property and interactions between size and time period, in addition to 
the regressors listed in Section 4.C. Specification (B) adds an interaction between the 
industrial-use dummy and the last time period of the study (MINDUSTRIAL3). 
Specifications (C) and (D) include census tract characteristics (as of 2000) to capture 
socioeconomic differences in neighborhood character.  
Table 2 had suggested that the VCP tends to attract larger sites. This would 
appear to be a recent phenomenon because the results of all the probit specifications in 
table 3 suggest that in the early years the program actually attracted smaller properties, 
but that trend was subsequently reversed. These are the implications of the signs and 
significance levels of the coefficient on SIZE, SIZE2, and SIZE3. It is possible that in the 
later years developers became familiar with the workings of the program and saw 
opportunities for economies of scale in assessment, development, and cleanup; moreover, 











                                                 
14 The correlation between any two error terms within the same site is generally small (about 0.03) and 
significant only at the 10% level. Nevertheless, random effects were incorporated to obtain the correct 
standard errors.   25
Table 3. Random Effects probit regression results. Dependent variable: 
participation in year t of the program. 
Variable  
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
coefficient  tstat  coefficient  tstat  coefficient  tstat  coefficient  tstat 
INTERCEPT ‐ 1.678010 ‐ 4.94** ‐ 1.449801 ‐ 4.21** ‐ 1.164552 ‐ 2.53* ‐ 1.667947 ‐ 3.85**
SIZE ‐ 0.018765 ‐ 2.01* ‐ 0.013602 ‐ 1.54 ‐ 0.013987 ‐ 1.58 ‐ 0.013935 ‐ 1.57
SIZE2 = size*(2000‐
03 dummy)  0.013557  1.40  0.013386  1.46  0.013249  1.44  0.013344  1.44
SIZE3 = size*(2004‐
06 dummy)  0.036325  3.62**  0.021049  2.02*  0.021564  2.06*  0.022257  2.11*
CBDDIST  0.000001  0.03 ‐ 0.000024 ‐ 0.65 ‐ 0.000035 ‐ 0.89 ‐ 0.000026 ‐ 0.63
BUILDING ‐ 0.226463 ‐ 1.37 ‐ 0.260919 ‐ 1.57 ‐ 0.258604 ‐ 1.54 ‐ 0.268075 ‐ 1.60
BUILDINGYRBUILT ‐ 0.000078 ‐ 0.68 ‐ 0.000092 ‐ 0.79 ‐ 0.000106 ‐ 0.91 ‐ 0.000103 ‐ 0.88
YRBUILTMISSING ‐ 0.640592 ‐ 3.21** ‐ 0.719794 ‐ 3.58** ‐ 0.757513 ‐ 3.66** ‐ 0.760784 ‐ 3.65**
CAPITAL ‐ 0.187718 ‐ 2.66** ‐ 0.196322 ‐ 2.73** ‐ 0.201543 ‐ 2.77** ‐ 0.197466 ‐ 2.72**
MJRDDIST ‐ 0.000180 ‐ 1.41 ‐ 0.000183 ‐ 1.42 ‐ 0.000143 ‐ 1.05 ‐ 0.000151 ‐ 1.08
PROBCON   0.475813  1.79^  0.475370  1.77^  0.464092  1.72^  0.445313  1.64
PROBCONMISSING  0.137286  0.70  0.119255  0.61  0.125401  0.64  0.111832  0.57
ENTZNE ‐ 0.014003 ‐ 0.08 ‐ 0.017537 ‐ 0.11 ‐ 0.064305 ‐ 0.36 ‐ 0.012449 ‐ 0.07
EMPZNE  0.068361  0.42  0.142767  0.88  0.113200  0.64  0.135206  0.82
LNEARVCPS  0.058682  5.08**  0.042576  3.42**  0.044719  3.49**  0.043546  3.42**
MINDUSTRIAL  0.454171  3.27**  0.238738  1.58  0.220864  1.44  0.231807  1.52
PCTIND  0.557989  1.41  0.589488  1.47  0.588896  1.46  0.332140  0.66
RESZNEDIST  0.000684  2.41*  0.000688  2.41*  0.000682  2.41*  0.000730  2.37*
MINDUSTRIAL3         0.734217  3.79**  0.716439  3.67**  0.711673  3.65**
MDVALHS               ‐ 0.000003 ‐ 0.82        
PCTCOLLEGE                 0.104482  0.16        
PCTPOVERTY                        0.976555  1.08
PCTOWNERS                        0.331421  0.62
PCTBLACKS                        ‐ 0.241601 ‐ 0.75





The probit model confirms that participation is also more likely to occur among 
sites without buildings (an effect that is not significant at the conventional levels, 
however) and among properties with lower capital intensity, suggesting a preference for 
sites with lower demolition and remediation costs.  Distance to the city center or to major   26
roads does not seem to be an important driver of participation. This finding should be 
interpreted with caution, because it may be due to collinearity and to the use of imperfect 
proxies for site access.  Distance to the city center is correlated with several other spatial 
characteristics, and distance to major roads may not fully capture how easy or difficult it 
is to access a particular property in an urban setting.  
As expected, participation is positively and significantly associated with the prior 
probability of contamination—in other words, the program is attracting sites that one 
would truly expect to be contaminated. That does not mean, of course, that the property 
must necessarily be cleaned up, and indeed about two-thirds of the VCP applications, as 
discussed in section 4.C, request a NFRD.  
There is no evidence of an independent effect of Enterprise and Empowerment 
Zone designations. However, these designations are correlated with land use, location, 
and size of the site. Once again, it is thus difficult to say whether this result is genuine or 
an artifact of collinearity. Most likely VCP properties—brownfields, for all practical 
purposes—are typically in abundant supply in blighted areas also addressed by state and 
federal economic development programs.  
At any rate, participation is more likely among sites that are slated for industrial 
use, and grows with distance from residential areas and—but only weakly—with the 
percentage of the surrounding land designated as industrial.
15 The number of nearby 
properties previously enrolled in the VCP is positively associated with the probability of 
participation. It is possible that successful participation encourages enrollment of other 
                                                 
15 The probit regressions reported in table 3 all use the 1500-meter buffer when computing the percentage 
of surrounding land dedicated to industrial uses, but we obtain the same result when we use smaller buffer 
sizes (e.g. 500 meters) to capture closer neighbors of each property in the sample.   27
nearby sites. Alternatively, this may also be due to the spatial clustering of brownfields, 
or to other unobserved amenities.  
Specification (B) confirms the results of specification (A), and also suggests that 
the prevalence of industrial properties among those enlisted in the VCP has strengthened 
in recent years, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of MINDUSTRIAL3. 
Specification (C) adds median housing values and education level of the residents in the 
census tract around each property, but neither variable has an independent effect on the 
likelihood of participation. We had intended these variables to proxy for up-and-coming 
neighborhoods, but their effect (if any) is probably already captured in other site and 
neighborhood characteristics.  Specification (D) includes other characteristics of the 
residents, namely the percentages of persons who live in poverty, own their homes, and 
are African American.  In both (C) and (D), likelihood ratio tests indicate that the newly 
added census-tract variables are jointly insignificant. 
To get a sense of the magnitude of the probit coefficients, using specification (B), 
we compute the annual probability of participation for a hypothetical industrial-use parcel 
of average size, distance to the CBD and capital intensity, and in an Enterprise Zone. We 
assume that this site has the average prior probability of contamination, that it is 
surrounded by the average extent of industrial land and is at the average distance from 
residential areas. For a parcel with these characteristics during the first period of the 
program (1997-99), the probability of participation in any given year is 6.52%. Increasing 
the size of this average parcel by a standard deviation (i.e., by 12.02 acres above the 
original 5.43 acres) slightly decreases the probability of enrollment from 6.52% to 
4.69%.    28
The story changes in more recent years: A parcel that is average in all respects 
and is zoned for industrial use would now have a much greater annual probability of 
participation (25.33%), which increases to 28.27% if the parcel’s size is increased by a 
standard deviation above the average. If this parcel during the most recent years of the 
program was located an additional quarter mile away from the nearest residential zone (a 
two standard-deviation increase), then the probability of participation would increase 
from 25.33% to 34.91%.   
 
7. Discussion  
Now that we have established what characteristics influence whether a site is 
enrolled in the VCP and the magnitude of such influences, it is important to discuss what 
happens after enrollment.  Specifically, are parcels participating in the Maryland VCP 
likely to be redeveloped soon? Possibly, but we believe that redevelopment is unlikely to 
bring significant land use changes. Of the 58 properties that had received a NFRD letter 
or a CoC within our study period, residential use was explicitly prohibited at 44 of them 
(75.80%). At 12 of them (20.69%), only limited residential development was allowed. 
 We obtained the specific land use before and after VCP completion for 40 of the 
properties that completed the program. Only 8 changed uses after completion: Most of 
them were converted from parking lots, warehouses, and manufacturing facilities to 
offices (3, 2 and 1 properties, respectively).  Only two properties were converted to 
residential use (one was initially a warehouse and the other a manufacturing facility).   
Taken together with the fact that the likelihood of participation is greater at 
industrial properties in industrial areas and increases with distance from residential   29
neighborhoods, the above evidence is suggestive that the vast majority of redevelopment 
would either keep the existing land use or convert the parcel to non-residential uses.  
Infill redevelopment is touted as helping meet Smart Growth goals and avoiding 
conversion of open space, so it is natural to ask how well the VCP is doing in this respect. 
As of December 2006, there were a total of 1,175 acres enrolled in the VCP in Baltimore 
City alone.  
Deason et al. (2001) consider 8 brownfield properties in Baltimore City and 
assume redevelopment as office buildings, commercial facilities, or homes (see table C.1 
in Appendix C). They calculate the land area that would be necessary if such 
redevelopment projects took place in surrounding suburban areas (Baltimore County, 
Kent County, and Frederick County). They consistently find that, based on local zoning, 
such redevelopment projects would require larger land areas in these latter three counties 
than in Baltimore City.  
Assuming that all of the participating 1,175 acres are redeveloped and remain in 
their use at the time of enrollment, we use the land area “ratios” derived by Deason et al. 
to estimate the amount of open space that the VCP may have deterred from being 
developed (see table B.2 in Appendix B). We consider greenfields in Baltimore County 
as likely substitutes for infill development because this rural/suburban area surrounds 
Baltimore City and is part of the overall Metropolitan area. If the urban redevelopment 
projects on VCP properties were instead built on greenfields, they would require as many 
as 6,444 acres in suburban Baltimore County under generous assumptions about the 
conversion “ratio” between city and suburban projects, and 1,238 under more 
conservative assumptions.    30
This suggests that if greenfields and brownfields are truly substitutable then the VCP is 
potentially an effective tool to deter open space conversion. 
 
8. Conclusions 
To understand the promise and potential of voluntary cleanup programs in 
promoting remediation and reuse of brownfields, we have focused on participation in the 
Maryland VCP, which began in 1997. To ensure a homogeneous legal and tax 
environment, we have restricted attention to the 116 Baltimore City sites that have 
participated as of the end of 2006. 
The vast majority of the applications (66%) request a “No Further Requirements 
Determination” on the part of the agency, suggesting that much participation in the 
program is simply motivated by developers or business owners’ desire to protect 
themselves from future environmental liability. A clean bill of health may, of course, also 
increase the value of property (and of any redevelopment project on site). In that sense, 
the evidence from Baltimore confirms the findings for the Colorado VCP reported in 
Alberini (2007). 
We compare the VCP properties with a sample of similar size selected at random 
from the universe of industrial and commercial properties in Baltimore. Probit 
regressions confirm that participation is more likely among industrial sites located in 
industrial areas, and less likely in the presence of improvements and heavy building 
capitalization. They also show that the distances to the city center and major roads, 
respectively, are not very important. Even more important, the probit regressions point to 
the changing nature of the program—or of the sites that tend to be attracted to the   31
program. In the first few years of the program, smaller properties tended to be attracted 
into the VCP. Most recently, however, participation has been more likely among larger 
properties, and the prevalence of industrial sites among the participants has become even 
stronger.  
Given the surrounding land use and the restrictions imposed on the use of the 
property by the VCP approval, it is likely that such industrial properties will be kept in 
industrial or perhaps commercial use, but will not be turned into residential projects.  
This conclusion is in sharp contrast with the findings in Alberini (2007), who concludes 
that properties who signed up with the Colorado VCP were most likely under residential 
development pressure. Given the limited body of research about VCPs and their context-
specific findings, it will be necessary to conduct more research at a variety of locations 
before one can attempt to extrapolate from one locale to another. 
Assuming that all of the participating 1,175 acres are redeveloped and remain in 
their use at the time of enrollment, and using the land area “ratios” derived by Deason et 
al. (2001), we estimate that if the urban redevelopment projects on VCP properties were 
instead built on greenfields, they would require between 1,238 and 6,444 acres in 
suburban Baltimore County. Since the majority of participating sites tend to remain in 
non-residential uses it appears that VCP programs, at least in the case of Baltimore, 
encourage potentially contaminating activities to take place on already contaminated 
brownfields, thus leaving pristine land available as open space or for less 
environmentally damaging uses. 
 
   32
REFERENCES 
Alberini, Anna (2007), “Determinants and Effects on Property Values of Participation in 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs: The Case of Colorado,” Contemporary Economic 
Policy, 25(3), 415-432.  
Alberini, Anna, Alberto Longo, Stefania Tonin, Francesco Trombetta and Margherita 
Turvani (2005) “The Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in 
Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: Evidence from Surveys of 
Developers,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 35(4), 327-351. 
Alker, S., V. Joy, P. Roberts and N. Smith (2000), “The Definition of Brownfield,” 
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 43(1), 49-69. 
Bartik, T. J. (1991). Who benefits from state and local economic development policies? 
Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment. 
 
Bartik, T. J. (2004). Evaluating the impacts of local economic development policies on 
local economic outcomes: What has been done and what is doable? In Evaluating 
local economic and employment development: How to assess what works among 
programmes and policies (pp. 113-141). Paris: OECD. 
 
Bartsch, Charles and B. Dorfman (2000), “Brownfields ‘State-of-the-State’: An End-of-
Session Review of Initiatives and Program Impact in the 50 States,” Washington, 
DC: Northeast-Midwest Institute.  
 
Bartsch, Charles, E. Collaton, and E. Pepper (1996), Coming clean for economic 
development:  A resource book on environmental cleanup and economic 
development opportunities, Washington, DC: Northeast-Midwest Institute. 
 
Daley, D. M. (2007), “Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Problems: Exploring the 
Rise of Nontraditional Public Policy,” The Policy Studies Journal, 35(2), 165-180. 
 
Deason, Jonathan P., George William Sherk, and Gary A. Carroll (2001), “Public Policies 
and Private Decisions Affecting the Redevelopment of Brownfields: An Analysis of 
Critical Factors, Relative Weights and Areal Differentials,” Report to the US EPA, 
GWU/EPA Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Cooperative 
Agreement, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~eem/Brownfields/  
 
DeSousa, Christopher (2000), “Brownfield Redevelopment versus Greenfield 
Redevelopment: A Private Sector Perspective on the Costs and Risks Associated 
with Brownfield Redevelopment in the Greater Toronto Area,” Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management, 43(6), 831-853. 
 
DeSousa, Christopher (2004), “The Greening of Brownfields in American Cities,” 
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 47(4), 579-600. 
   33
Fisher, P., and A. Peters (1998), Industrial Incentives:  Competition among American 
States and Cities, Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
Press. 
 
Fogleman, V.M. (1992), Hazardous Waste Cleanup, Liability, and Litigation: A 
Comprehensive Guide to Superfund Law, Westport, CT: Quorum. 
 
Fox, W. F., and M. N. Murray (2004), “Do Economic Effects Justify the Use of Fiscal 
Incentives?” Southern Economic Journal, 71(1), 78-92. 
 
Greene, William H. (2008), Econometric Analysis, 6
th edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson-Prentice Hall. 
 
Greenstone, Michael and Enrico Moretti (2003), “Bidding for Industrial Plants:  Does 
Winning a 'Million Dollar Plant' Increase Welfare? NBER Working Paper No. 9844, 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
Howland, Marie (2000), “The Impact of Contamination on the Canton/Southeast 
Baltimore Land Market,” Journal of the American Planning Association, 66(4), 
411-420. 
 
Howland, Marie (2003), “Private Initiative and Public Respnsibility for the 
Redevelopment of Industrial Brownfields: Three Baltimore Case Studies,” 
Economic Development Quarterly, 17(4), 367-381. 
 
Howland, Marie (2004), “The Role of Contamination in Central City Industrial Decline,” 
Economic Development Quarterly, 18(3), 207-219. 
 
McGrath, D.T. (2000), “Urban Industrial Land Redevelopment and Contamination Risk,” 
Journal of Urban Economics, 47, 414-442. 
 
Meyer, Peter B. (2000), “Looking at State Voluntary Cleanup Programs in Perspective: 
Liability Relief, Flexible Cleanup Standards and Institutional Controls as Forms 
of Economic Development Subsidies,” working paper, Center for Environmental 
Policy and Management, University of Louisville.  
 
Meyer, P. B., and T.S. Lyons (2000), “Lessons from Private Sector Brownfield 
Redevelopers: Planning Public Support for Urban Regeneration,” Journal of the 
American Planning Association, 66(1), 46-57. 
 
Meyer, P.B., and H.W. VanLandingham (2000), “Reclamation and Economic 
Regeneration of Brownfields,” Reviews of Economic Development Literature and 
Practice, 1, Washington, DC: US Economic Development Administration. 
   34
Newman, R. J., and D. Sullivan (1988), “Econometric Analysis of Business Tax Impacts 
on Industrial Location:  What Do We Know and How Do We Know It?” Journal of 
Urban Economics, 23(2), 215-234. 
 
Noonan, Frank, and Charles A. Vidich (1992), “Decision Analysis for Utilizing 
Hazardous Waste Site Assessment in Real Estate Acquisition,” Risk Analysis, 12(2), 
245-251. 
 
Page, G. W. and R. S. Berger (2006), “Characteristics and Land Use of Contaminated 
Brownfield Properties in Voluntary Cleanup Agreement Programs,” Land Use 
Policy, 23, 551-559. 
 
Peters, A., and P. Fisher (2002), State Enterprise Zone Programs:  Have They Worked? 
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Press. 
 
Peters, A., and P. Fisher (2004), “The Failure of Economic Development Incentives,” 
Journal of the American Planning Association, 70(1), 27-37. 
Schoenbaum, M. (2002), “Environmental Contamination, Brownfields Policy, and 
Economic Redevelopment in an Industrial Area of Baltimore, Maryland,” Land 
Economics, 78(1):60-71. 
Sementelli, A. J. and R. A. Simons (1997), “Regulation of Leaking Underground Storage 
Tanks: Policy Enforcement and Unintended Consequences,” Economic 
Development Quarterly, 11(3), 236–48. 
Shadish, William R., Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell (2002), Experimental 
and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference, Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin. 
Sigman, Hilary (2005), “Environmental Liability and Redevelopment of Old Industrial 
Sites,” Draft paper, Rutgers University, April.    
 
US General Accounting Office (1995), Community Development: Reuse of Urban 
Industrial Sites, GAO/RCED 95-172, Washington, DC. 
 
US General Accounting Office (1997), Superfund: State Voluntary Programs Provide 
Incentives to Encourage Cleanups, GAO/RCED-97-66, Washington, DC, April.  
  
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2005), State Brownfields and Voluntary 
Response Programs: An Update from the States, EPA-560-R-05-001, Washington, 
DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency 
Response, February. 
 
US Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/glossary.htm, 
accessed 30 September 2007. 
   35
Wasylenko, M. (1997). “Taxation and Economic Development: The State of the 
Economic Literature,” New England Economic Review, March/April, 37-52. 
 
Wernstedt, Kris, Peter Meyer, and Anna Alberini (2006), “Attracting Private Investment 
to Contaminated Properties: The Value of Public Interventions,” Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, 25(2), 347-369. 
 
Yount, K. R., and P.B. Meyer (1999), “Factors Affecting Investments in Small- and 
Large-scale Brownfield Projects,” Urban Ecology, 3(4), 351-365. 
 
 
   36
















     38
Appendix B. Calculation of land area conversion ratios.  
Table B.1. Property specific conversion ratios. 
Deason et al. calculations for Baltimore City Brownfield Properties 
property 
size 
(acres) assumed  reuse 
required area if in 
Baltimore County 
(acres) ratio 
1  15  office buildings  18.37  1 : 1.22 
2 4.5  redeveloped  comm.  facility  9.18  1 : 2.04 
3  0.7  office buildings  4.59  1 : 6.12 
4  2.75  two office buildings  5.42  1 : 1.97 
5 6 
residential multi-family 
complex  6.00  1 : 1 
6  1.3  residential, 26 townhomes  2.25  1 : 1.73 
7  2.8  residential  2.23  1 : 0.80 
8  0.17  two-story office building  0.67  1 : 3.94 
Source: Deason et al. (2001).  
 Table B.2. Development conversion rates assumed in this paper (see Section 7).   
land use  N 
total 
acres "ratio"   
total required for 
equivalent projects 
in suburban areas 
A. Generous assumptions* 
industrial  83  975.02  6.24 6084.12
commercial  14  62.86  3.0875 194.08
residential  6  32.79  1.86 60.99
other   13  104.86  1.00 104.86
         Total  6444.05
B. More conservative assumptions** 
industrial  83  975.02  1.00 975.02
commercial  14  62.86  2.00 125.72
residential  6  32.79  1.00 32.79
other   13  104.86  1.00 104.86
         total  1238.39
              
Note:  
* Means of the conversion ratios for the Baltimore projects reported in Deason et al. 
(2001), except for industrial use projects, where the figure in this table (.6.24) is the 
nationwide average for industrial projects nationwide. (Deason et al. do not do examine 
industrial projects for Baltimore.)  
** Median conversion ratios. The same exceptions as in * apply. NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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